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I
TYING ARRANGEMENTS

In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,' the
Supreme Court came close to eliminating a long-standing antitrust
anomaly-the differing tests of illegality applied to tie-ins, depending
upon the antitrust enactment invoked against them. If the tying or
tied product may be classified as "goods, wares, ... or other commodities," ' 2 the case falls within the ambit of the Clayton Act, and the
plaintiff need only show that a not insubstantial amount of commerce
* This article is based upon addresses delivered before the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association on August 11, 1969, and the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York on October 29, 1969. The author acknowledges with gratitude the
assistance of Michael D. Blechman, Lawrence S. Feld, and David F. Ryan in the preparation of this article.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1924, LL.B. 1926, Columbia University;
LL.D. (honoris causa) 1965, Hebrew University.
1 394 US. 495 (1969).
2 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), applies only to sales or leases "of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities . ..
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in the tied product is involved. But if the tie does not relate to a
commodity, but concerns land, services or credit, which do not fit
the Clayton Act's language, it is governed by the Sherman Act, and
the plaintiff must accordingly bear the additional burden of proving
that defendant's economic power with respect to the tying product
is sufficient to produce an appreciable restraint.4 This dichotomy,
which has never had any functional justification, has been substantially
eroded since its original articulation in Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States5 in 1953. In a series of decisions, 6 the Court
gradually weakened the market power requirement to the point where,
in United States v. Loew's Inc., 7 Justice Goldberg stated that the mere
3 The Clayton Act rule was synthesized in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953):
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the "tying"
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3
of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite potential lessening of
competition is inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market," a
tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met.
Id. at 608-09 (emphasis by the Court). See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9
REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 175 (1954).
4 [Tie-ins] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial" amount
of interstate commerce is affected.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments, 13 RxcomR oF N.Y.C.B.A. 417 (1958). Tie-ins may also be attacked by the
Federal Trade Commission as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). With respect to exclusive dealing
arrangements challenged under that statute, the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966), that the Commission may declare such practices
unlawful even though the standards of section 3 of the Clayton Act are not met. See
Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76
YALE L.J. 92, 93 (1966). With respect to tie-ins, Times-Picayune stated in dictum that
the Clayton Act test would apply in FTC proceedings. 345 U.S. at 609. But Brown Shoe
suggests that even that criterion might not be necessary, although the Commission would
not be likely to challenge a transaction with de minimis anticompetitive effect. Moreover,
if the tying product is patented, the tie-in constitutes patent misuse whether or not the
antitrust laws have been violated. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488 (1942), and text at note 228 infra. Again, however, if only a de minimis amount
of commerce is affected, it is hard to see how a successful patent misuse claim can be
made out. Hence, for practical purposes, all that need be shown for a Clayton Act
violation, an unlawful unfair method of competition, or a patent misuse is that the
amount of restricted commerce rises above the level of de minimis.
5 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
6 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
7 Market dominance-some power to control price and to exclude competition-is
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desirability of the tying product to consumers created a sufficient basis
from which the requisite market power could be inferred. The next
logical step appeared to be the de facto elimination of the market
power criterion by a holding that the very success of a tying arrangement was proof of the seller's power. While the Fortner opinion suggests that the Court is inclined to do just that, it retains enough of the
market power requirement to perpetuate the confusion enveloping this
phase of the law, not least of all for the parties involved in the case.
Fortner, a real estate developer, borrowed $2 million from a
wholly-owned subsidiary of U.S. Steel to finance the entire cost of the
purchase and development of two tracts of land." The interest rate
and other charges were extremely low-so low, in fact, that such
100% financing could not have been obtained from any other source
on comparable terms.9 The loan agreement also provided that, in
developing the land, plaintiff was required to use only U.S. Steel prefabricated houses.' 0 Plaintiff, believing that U.S. Steel's houses were
more expensive and otherwise less desirable than those available elsewhere," sued for relief from this restriction and for treble damages
for his lost profits.
Unlike the ordinary tie-in, the seller, which was not in the business of lending money generally, supplied credit at uniquely inexpensive and otherwise advantageous terms in order to induce developers
to buy U.S. Steel prefabricated homes. 1 2 Nevertheless, one need have
no conceptual difficulty in characterizing this arrangement as a tie-in, 3
the tying product or service being credit and the tied product being
prefabricated homes. The allure necessary to make the tie effective is
nothing more than U.S. Steel's willingness to offer the tying product
by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite economic power.
Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may
be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness
in its attributes.
United States v. Loew's Inc., 871 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
8 894 U.S. at 497.
9 Id. at 504.
10 Id. at 497.
11 Id.
12 In the ordinary tie-in situation, the seller seeks to induce the purchase of the

tied product by tying it to that of a separate product, normally not otherwise available
to the buyer.
13 "[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 856 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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at low or non-profitable rates. In short, what we have here is a form
of promotion.
The real policy question to be decided was whether or not this
kind of tying arrangement should fall within the per se proscription.
It is striking that the Court never actually comes to grips with this
question. Instead, enmeshed in the rubric of market power, it grapples
with a number of difficult-and unnecessary-factual issues which it
ultimately orders the district court to resolve on remand. 14 The case
thus demonstrates that an old adage may have some truth, even when
stood on its head: bad law, it would seem, can sometimes make hard
cases.
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Fortner,15 begins his
opinion by rearticulating the dual test of substantiality of commerce
and market power which must be met in order to find a tie-in per se
illegal under the Sherman Act. 16 Dealing first with the question of
substantiality, the Court makes dear that the applicable standard is
not the amount of plaintiff's purchases, but rather defendant's aggregate sales to all buyers made pursuant to similar arrangements. 7
Finding that the amount of these sales was not de minimis and, consequently, that substantial commerce was affected by the tie,' 8 Justice
Black proceeds to discuss the second Sherman Act criterion: market
power.
In the course of his analysis, the Justice suggests at least three
separate bases for determining whether the requisite market power
exists. The -very fact that defendant was able to exact a higher price
from plaintiff for prefabricated houses would itself indicate that de14 In essence, the case was remanded for a trial on the issue of U.S. Steel's economic
power in the credit market. See 894 U.S. at 509.
15 Justice Black's opinion was for himself, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan,

Marshall, and Douglas. Justice White joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, as did Jfistice
Fortas joined by Justice Stewart.
16 The opinion quotes the language cited in note 4 supra from Northern Pacific. 594

U.S. at 498-99.
17 For purposes of determining whether the amount of commerce foreclosed
is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the practice, therefore, the relevant
figure is the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge, not
the portion of this total accounted for by the particular plaintiff who brings suit.
Id. at 502. Since the principal tie-in cases decided by the Court had been brought by the
government (so that only the total commerce tied could have been relevant), Fortner
appears to have been the first occasion for the pronouncement of such a rule.
18 The test of "absolute quantitative substantiality" (as distinguished from a "comparative percentage" test) is far from new. See, e.g., Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault &
Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936) (concerning an exclusive dealing arrangement).
It now seems clear that whatever the appropriate test may be for exclusive dealing
arrangements, any tie-in which has more than a de minimis effect will meet this standard.
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fendant had "some special economic power in the credit market." 1
Thus the Court comes dose to stating that the success of a tying arrangement constitutes its own proof of market power. If this were the
Court's holding, no remand would be necessary. The fact, however,
is that the case was remanded for a determination of defendant's
market power.
After citing earlier cases to the effect that a showing of monopoly
power is no longer required,20 Justice Black indicates that it is sufficient if the seller is able to exert some power over some of the buyers
in the market. 21 "[T]he proper focus of concern" is said to be "whether
the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome
22
terms such as a tie-in ... ." upon an appreciable number of buyers.
Although a full page of the opinion is directed to an analysis of this
standard, 23 the sum total of what the Court appears to be saying is that
market power exists whenever there is power to impose the tie-in. It
is thus difficult to discern how the second standard differs from the
first.
Justice Black's third test turns on the seller's unique economic
advantages over his competitors. 24 Such advantages, the Court says,
may be legal, physical or economic. 2 5 Since U.S. Steel obviously had
no physical advantage in lending money, and since its legal advantages,
19 394 U.S. at 504.
20 Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably dear that the economic power over
the tying product can be sufficient even though the power falls far short of
dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the
buyers in the market.

Id. at 502-03, citing United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 US. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947).
21 "Such appreciable restraints result whenever the seller can exert some power over
some of the buyers in the market, even if his power is not complete over them and over all
other buyers in the market." 394 U.S. at 503.
22 Id. at 504.
23 Id. at 503-04.
24 We do not mean to accept petitioner's apparent argument that market power
can be inferred simply because the kind of financing terms offered by a lending
company are "unique and unusual." We do mean, however, that uniquely and
unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's unique economic advantages
over his competitors.
Id. at 505.
25 Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some
way prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves: Such barriers
may be legal, as in the case of patented and copyrighted products .... or physical,
as when the product is land .

. .

. It is true that the barriers may also be

economic, as when competitors are simply unable to produce the distinctive
product profitably ....

Id. at 505 n2.
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if any, would affect banks and similar lending institutions alone
(which were arguably prohibited from extending 100% financing 2 )
and not finance companies or other commercial competitors, the Court
concentrates on U.S. Steel's possible economic advantages. 27 Here,
Justice Black refers in general terms to defendant's nationwide operations, and the possible resulting economies of scale.28 Although rejecting the idea that the "unique and unusual financing terms" by themselves warranted an inference of market power 29 (a concept which
would again be tantamount to eliminating the criterion altogether),
Justice Black does say that such attractive terms "can reflect a credi30
tor's unique economic advantages over his competitors."
Whatever one might think of the Court's standards as an abstract
matter, it is hard to fathom their relevance to the fact situation
actually presented in Fortner.A concept of market power predicated
upon the ability to raise prices and impose the tie is without application here. U.S. Steel, which was offering plaintiff money at a particularly cheap rate, obviously did not have the power to raise the price of
credit. Indeed, if it had tried to do so, the whole rationale for the deal
would have disappeared and Fortner would either have borrowed the
money elsewhere or not embarked on the development scheme at all.
As Justice White points out in dissent,3 1 a company which has real
power does not lower its prices; it raises them. 32 The plain fact is that
what U.S. Steel did was to induce Fortner to accept the tie by offering
him a bargain on the tying product.
A standard focusing on whether U.S. Steel's cheap credit was a
resultant of its "economic advantages" as a purveyor of credit appears
equally divorced from the realities of the case. A loan is profitable
only if the return to the lender is commensurate with his risks. Otherwise the probability is that the lender will lose rather than make
26 "In addition, potential competitors such as banks and savings and loan associations
may have been prohibited from offering 100% financing by state or federal law." Id.
at 506, citing Federal Reserve Act § 24, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. IV, 1965-68); 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-14(c) (1969).
27 See 394 US. at 505-06.
28 TIfhe unwillingness of competing financial institutions in the area to offer
100% financing probably reflects their feeling that they could not profitably lend
money on the risks involved. US. Steel's subsidiary Credit Corp., on the other
hand, may well have had a substantial competitive advantage in providing this
type of financing because of economies resulting from the nationwide character
of its operations.
Id. at 505-06.
29 Id. at 505.
50 Id.
31 Id. at 510.
32 Id. at 515.
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money on the transaction. In such a case, the lender cannot make his
unprofitable loan profitable simply by making other unprofitable
loans on a nationwide basis. Any attempt to do so would be as futile
as that of a manufacturer who sells each unit below cost, but tries to
make up his losses on volume. Whatever the source of one's moneybe it cheap bank loans, monopoly profits, or inheritance-a decision
to sell or lend so as to yield a smaller return than the market would
allow is not a question of power so much as a willingness, for some
extrinsic reason, to accept less than maximum profits. U.S. Steel was
willing to allow its subsidiary to operate at a comparatively low
profit 33 in order to increase its sales of profitable prefabricated houses.
The Court, caught in the terminology of market power, speaks of the
"ability to force," 84 rather than a "willingness" to sell for less.
Are the seller's economic advantages more relevant when the tying
product is not credit but rather a commodity? The answer may, perhaps, be found in the rationale underlying the invalidation of tieins in the first place. A tie-in has two anticompetitive impacts. It compels the buyer to buy a product he does not want in order to obtain
one which he desires. And it forecloses the seller's competitors in the
market for the tied product from the buyer's business for a reason
unrelated to the price or quality of that product.
From the buyer's point of view, if he is, as a practical matter,
compelled by the circumstances of the transaction to buy something
he does not want, it should not matter what the reason for placing him
in that position may be. If the tying product is patented35 or is
uniquely desirable to him, 36 one could attribute the ability to force
the tie to the seller's economic advantages over his competitors and
his superior market position. But if the tie-in is attractive to the buyer
because of the seller's willingness to set a lower price on the tying
product (which presumably would be more expensive without the
tie), the ultimate question is whether there is a corresponding economic benefit to the buyer warranting his willing purchase of both
products as a package; or whether to obtain the favorable price for
the tying product he nonetheless is being compelled to buy the tied
product which he would prefer to purchase elsewhere. In either event,
it is not the seller's economic advantage which makes for illegality,
but rather the compulsion exacted upon the buyer.
33 "The Credit Corporation did not operate at a loss, but its profit was comparatively

low." Id. at 525 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
See generally id. at 503-05.
85 E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
36 E.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
34
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From the viewpoint of the seller's competitors, all that matters is
that the tie-in has been successful. Success invariably results in competitive foreclosure. It is thus entirely immaterial, as a practical matter, how the foreclosure came about. If there is a tie-in sale, the seller's
competitors suffer regardless of whether it is monopoly, uniqueness,
economic advantage or any other factor which brings about the tie.
While it may distort the meaning of language to equate economic
advantage or a successful promotion with market power in an antitrust
sense, one would have to be blind not to recognize that economic advantage can be the instrument by which foreclosure is achieved. Unlike
the buyer who has no cause for complaint unless he is compelled to
buy something which he does not want, the seller's competitors can be
harmed regardless of whether any compulsion is practiced on the
buyer. Even a competitor who is so efficient that he can sell the tied
product at a price slightly above marginal cost would lose out competitively against the seller who, by virtue of the tie-in, lowers the
price of the tying product to a level where the buyer has no alternative but to give him the business on both products. The seller's competitors are accordingly denied the buyer's patronage not because of
any lack of efficiency on their part but because of their inability to
provide the tying product on equivalent terms. Absent buyer compulsion there is no tie-in; but it does not follow from this fact that
there may not be other types of illegality insofar as the seller's competitors are concerned.
Justice Black's conceptual framework is particularly disturbing
because the district court has now been ordered to make a factual
determination as to whether the defendant actually does possess market
power.3 7 On this point, Justice Fortas' utter confusion as to exactly
what it is that plaintiffs will have to show appears justified.38
It is ironic that one rationale given by Justice Goldberg in United
States v. Loew's Inc.3 9 for his further restriction of the concept of
market power was that by creating a rule which would eliminate the
necessity of investigating market position, the application of the per se
rule could be simplified. As Justice Goldberg put it:
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of
either uniqueness or consumer appeal, and since market determination in the present context does not necessitate a demon37 "Under these circumstances the pleadings and affidavits sufficiently disclose the
possibility of market power over borrowers in the credit market to entitle petitioner to go
to trial on this issue." 394 US. at 506.
38 See Justice Fortas' dissent, id. at 523-24 n.*.
89 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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stration of market power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act,
it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon
a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market
for the tying product and into the corollary
problem of the
40
seller's percentage share in that market.
Like the majority, the dissenters in Fortneravoid facing the real
issue presented by choosing instead to argue a case that was not before
the Court: whether, in extending credit, pure and simple, to a purchaser only in respect of his purchase, there is any tie-in at all. Thus,
despite Justice Black's admonition to the contrary, Justice White states
that the majority's reasoning would apply equally to a straight credit
sale.41 He then proceeds to equate favorable credit terms with a price
reduction, and concludes that U.S. Steel's competitors could have
offered equally attractive terms merely by reducing the price of their
42
prefabricated houses.
In addition to not being germane-since the financing in question in fact covered the purchase of land as well as prefabricated
houses43-the dissenters' view ignores some basic economic realities.
For a developer, there is a qualitative difference between the alternatives of, on the one hand, embarking on a project without having to
put up any money of his own, or, on the other hand, having to invest
his own capital, but getting a cheaper price on his materials. Few
developers would have any difficulty in opting for 1007 financing.
How, then, should the antitrust laws deal with tying arrangements? One thing seems crystal-clear to me. It makes absolutely no
sense to have differing legal standards depending upon which statutory
prohibition is invoked. If tie-ins can serve a socially useful purpose
where there is no demonstrable anticompetitive impact, a plaintiff
should be required to demonstrate the likelihood of a lessening of
competition in a full-scale, rule-of-reason inquiry. Conversely, if, as
the Court has stated, 44 tie-ins do not generally serve any useful purat 45 n.4.
"The logic of the majority opinion, then, casts great doubt on credit financing by
sellers." 394 US. at 516.
42 Id. at 515.
40 Id.
41

43

Specifically, petitioner claimed that in order to obtain loans totaling over

$2,000,000 from the Credit Corp. for the purchase and development of certain
land ....
it had been required to agree, as a condition of the loans, to erect
a prefabricated house manufactured by US. Steel on each of the lots purchased
with the loan proceeds.

Id. at 497.
44 "Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 805-06 (1949).
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pose, they should be condemned, whatever the statutory framework of
the proceeding may be.
In view of the ambiguity of what market power means in a tie-in
context, we might simply say that all tie-ins are bad and, in the absence
of special economic justifications, 45 should be proscribed. 46 Illumination is provided by the common law of restraint of trade. Ever since
Mitchel v. Reynolds in 1711,47 a distinction has been drawn between
voluntary and involuntary restraints, with the latter being condemned.
By focusing upon the involuntary nature of a tie-in, 48 we can avoid an
unnecessary and fruitless inquiry into market power and still achieve
a just rule. So long as the buyer must buy a product he does not want
in order to purchase one which he does want-which, after all, is the
essence of a tie-in-the arrangement should be unlawful unless a
special justification for it can be shown. But, if the tying product is
not unique and is generally available at an equivalent price, how can
it be said that the buyer was required to buy the tied product? If he
did not want it, he could easily have obtained the tying product elsewhere. Under such a standard, all of the factors which the courts have
examined to discover market power will still be highly relevant, but
in a more meaningful sense.
As I mentioned, even a rule premised on the involuntariness of
the restraint ought to be subject to justification for special economic
circumstances such as the necessity of protecting a nascent industry49
and in protecting a seller's good will.00 In Fortner, one could argue
that a similar legitimate purpose would exist if it were in fact the case
that, without a tie-in, 100% financing would not be available at all to
developers at economically feasible costs. It may be that the availability of such financing serves an important objective-such as encouraging needed construction-which in fact cannot be achieved in
45 E.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545
(ED. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567.(1961).

46 "Of course where the buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no
tying problem even though the seller may also offer the two items as a unit at a single
price." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1958).
47 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
48 If there is, as a practical matter, no compulsion (either contractual or economic)
to take the tied product as a condition of obtaining the tying product, there is simply
no tie-in at all in a meaningful sense.
49 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960),
af'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
80 E-g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S.
125 (1965); Balker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962). See Handler, Recent AntitrUst Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 852 (1965).
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a less restrictive manner and which may outweigh the impact upon
the buyer or the seller's competitors. Without passing on this question, it nonetheless seems to be an issue which-without the false
issue of market power-a court can at least face squarely.
Even if it cannot be shown that there is a meaningful involuntary restraint-if the buyer is not as a practical matter required to
purchase an unwanted product-the transaction may not necessarily
be free from antitrust concern. To be sure, there would be no tie-in,
and hence no occasion to invoke a per se rule. But if the seller, by use
of his overall economic advantages, offers a package of products on
such attractive terms as to foreclose competition in the market for one
such product, there may be a contract in unreasonable restraint of
trade or an unfair method of competition to be assessed in the context
of a rule of reason.5 1
It is significant that, in the only decision5 2 thus far applying Fortner, the Fourth Circuit took Justice Black's decision as support for
the proposition that market power could be inferred from the very
fact of the successful imposition of a tie-in on a substantial number
of customers. 53 Although the Fourth Circuit has cited Fortner for
what it might have decided rather than for what the Court in fact
held, it does take a large step toward equating the Clayton Act and
Sherman Act standards and thus freeing courts from the burden of
rationalizing market power language with functional reality. Fortner
was an unnecessarily difficult case. The Fourth Circuit's decision suggests that perhaps we can hope to soon see better law-and easier cases.
II
AGREEMENTS TO EXCHANGE PRICE INFORMATION

It merely underscores the obvious to assert that a precedent cannot be appraised without an understanding of its exact import.54 This
51 Cf. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 US. 316 (1966).
52

Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969).

"For the same reason, a seller's successful imposition of a tying arrangement on a
substantial amount of commerce may be taken as proof of his economic power over the
tying product." Id. at 62, citing Fortner.
54 Cases do not unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up their kernel
slowly and painfully. The instance cannot lead to a generalization till we know
it as it is. That in itself is no easy task. Eor the thing adjudged comes to us oftentimes swathed in obscuring dicta, which must be stripped off and cast aside.
B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROcEss 29 (1921).
53
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difficulty confronts any commentator endeavoring to determine the
significance of United States v. Container Corp. of America.55
That case dealt with a sui generis situation* "unlike any other
price decisions"5 6 previously rendered by the Court. At issue was the
legality of an informal agreement among competitors to exchange
specific information as to the prices charged or quoted to identified
customers. The majority opinion does not explicitly declare such an
arrangement to be unlawful per se, although it is classified as "a pricefixing agreement," 57 and in a footnote referring to United States v.
Socony Vacuum Co.,5s Justice Douglas observes that "all forms of
price-fixing are per se violations of the Sherman Act." 59 Yet at one
point the Court acknowledges that "price information exchanged in
some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price."60
Nevertheless, the opinion concludes with the admonition that "[p]rice
is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an
informal manner to restrain competition." 1
I
The concurring and dissenting opinions only add to the enigma.
Justice Fortas, in concurring, states it to be his understanding that the
majority does not hold the challenged agreement per se violative of
the antitrust laws. 62 Justice Marshall, on the other hand, in a dissent
in which he is joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, construes the
majority as having added another per se prohibition to the ever-increasing list of such offenses6 3
Under what circumstances is an agreement among competitors
to exchange price information unlawful? Is such an exchange to be
treated on a parity with other forms of price agreements? Or does its
legality stand on a separate footing? And what is the significance of a
price exchange where there is no underlying agreement? These are
some of the thorny problems which merit consideration.
Defendants were eighteen 4 manufacturers of corrugated containers who together accounted for ninety percent of the total ship55 393 US. 333 (1969).
56 Id. at 334.
57 Id.

58 310 US. 150 (1940).
59 393 US. at 338 n.4.
60 Id. at 337.
61 Id. at 338.
62 Id. at 338-39.
63 Id. at 341.

64 Nineteen defendants were named in the government's complaint. The case against
one was dismissed when the firm went out of business. Brief for Appellant at 2 n.1, United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 US. 333 (1969).
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ments of such containers from plants in the southeastern United
States. There was no charge that they had engaged in any of the
garden varieties of price-fixing.6 5 Nor did the government question
the statistical reporting activity of defendants' trade association, which
collected price data regarding past or closed sales and disseminated
abstract statistical summaries without identifying the parties to specific
transactions. 6 According to the majority, the gist of the case was each
defendant's practice of requesting from its competitors "information
as to the most recent price charged or quoted, whenever it needed
such information and whenever it was not available from another
7
source."
The stress in the complaint was that the challenged agreement
had been entered into "for the purpose and with the effect of restricting price competition." 68 At trial, the government conceded that "if
it had only charged in the Complaint that the defendants had agreed
to exchange price information, it would have no case, and that the
Complaint would be subject to dismissal." 69 From this concession the
district, court inferred that the government had undertaken the additional burden of proving a further understanding and agreement
to use the exchanged price information "for the purpose and with the
effect of maintaining substantially identical price quotations to specific
customers or minimizing the amount of any price reductions to be
offered to such customers."7 0 Finding that this burden had not been
discharged, the trial judge ruled in favor of the defendants.
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, finds that the exchange agreement "seemed to have the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit." 71 He thus concludes that the defendants' practice in fact
7 2had stabilized prices, "though at a downward level.
The Court notes that the "industry is dominated by relatively
few sellers," 73 the "product is fungible, ' 74 demand is inelastic, 75 and
price is the principal form of competition.7 6 Reasoning that the ex65 393 Us. at 334-35.
66 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 273 F. Supp. 18, 67 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
67 393 U.S. at 335.
68 Complaint at 7, 11, United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
69 273 F. Supp. at 59.

70 Id.
71

393 US. at 336.

72 Id.
73 Id. at 337.
74 Id.

75 Id.
76 Id.
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change of price data in this market "tends toward price uniformity,"7 7
it finds that the practice had "an anticompetitive effect . . . chilling

78
the vigor of price competition."
While conceding that the evidence is "not overwhelming," Justice
Fortas, in his concurrence, concludes that "the probability that the
exchange of specific price information led to an unlawful effect upon
prices is adequately buttressed by evidence in the record.17 9 In support of this conclusion, he relies upon the district court's finding that
when a defendant received information with respect to a competitor's
price he would often quote "substantially the same price."80 From
this the Justice argues that the agreement to exchange prices made

it possible for the defendants "confidently" to "at least ..

.

limit any

price cuts to the minimum necessary to meet competition."8' 1
Neither the majority nor Justice Fortas appears to give any weight
to many of the other facts established below. The trial judge had found
on the basis of uncontested statistical data that there was no uniformity, harmony, stability or parallelism in price8 2 either among the
defendants or among their individual plants.83 During the period
covered by the complaint8 4 the prices declined despite a marked increase in production costs.8 5 In addition, the government had stipulated that each defendant "requested price information from other
defendants in order to aid it in making informed pricing and marketing decisions"8 6 and that the ultimate pricing decision of each defendant was made individually in the exercise of its own business judgment.8 7 The district court specifically found that the industry had

grown from thirty manufacturers with forty-nine plants in 1955 to
fifty-one manufacturers with ninety-eight plants in 1963,88 that shipments increased from nine billion square feet to sixteen billion square
feet over the same period,8 9 and that a viable manufacturing facility
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 339.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 340.

82 273 F. Supp. at 61.
83 Id.

84 January 1, 1955 to October 14, 1963. Id. at 21.
85 Id. at 61.

86 Brief for Appellees at 12, United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 89a US. 838
(1969).
87 273 F. Supp. at 26-27.
88 Id. at 22.
89 Id. at 23.
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could be established with as small an investment as $50,000 to
$75,000.10
Justice Marshall, in dissent, first observes that the "court has refused to apply a per se rule to exchanges of price and market information in the past," 91 and perceives no reason in the present case for departing from that conclusion. He agrees with the majority that,
"market knowledge is certainly not an evil in perfectly competitive
markets." 92 However, while Justice Douglas emphasizes the fact that
the industry is dominated by "relatively few sellers," Justice Marshall
notes that entry is easy and that the number of sellers had in fact
increased during the complaint period. Though agreeing with the
majority that demand is inelastic, Justice Marshall is impressed by
the market's having doubled in size in recent years.
According to Justice Marshall, the district court's finding that a
defendant would usually charge "substantially the same price" as a
reporting competitor should be read together with the finding "that
price decisions were individual decisions, and that defendants frequently did cut prices. 0' 3 Moreover, he considers the "few isolated
statements found in the depositions of industry witnesses . . . totally
insufficient" to support a finding of unlawful purpose. 94 Concluding
that the agreement had no adverse anticompetitive effect and was not
animated by any improper purpose, he would affirm the dismissal by
the court below.
Since it is not readily apparent whether the three opinions rest
upon different legal premises or different appraisals of the facts, it
may be useful to analyze the problems which the case raises in terms
of fundamental antitrust principles.
Let us first consider the situation where price information is exchanged without any express agreement to do so. If such exchanges
occur with some degree of regularity, even though infrequently, it
would not be improper to infer a tacit agreement to exchange prices
from the course of conduct. And it is inarguable that such exchanges
constitute circumstantial evidence which, taken together with all the
other facts, might also be probative of an agreement to fix prices. In
Container Corp., where no uniformity or parallelism of price could
be shown and the price trend was downward, the trier of facts would
doubtless reach a different conclusion from the case where there was
90 Id.
91 393 US. at 341.
92 Id. at 842.
93 Id. at W.
94 Id. at 344.
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a history of price leadership with rare deviations on the part of any
seller from the leader's announced price. In an industry with the latter
kind of price behavior, even a casual communication could have a potent effect of implementing the prevailing price pattern.
We next turn to the situation where there exists an actual agreement to exchange prices. I believe the trial court was in error in requiring the government to prove a supplemental agreement to use the
exchanged information for the purpose and with the effect of stabilizing prices. A compact to exchange price information plainly should be
unlawful without more if its purpose or effect was to stabilize prices.
The interesting question is whether the agreement of itself, regardless
of purpose or effect, should be unlawful as a matter of law.
Justice Marshall, in shying away from a per se construction, draws
heavily upon the economic philosophy of Professor Turner. While
admitting that there "is some danger that price information will be
used for anticompetitive purposes, particularly the maintenance of
prices at a high level,"9 5 he is of the opinion that the exchange in this
industry was, at worst, a neutral factor. Unlike Justice Douglas, he was
unwilling to conclude that "this particular market is sufficiently oligopolistic . . . to justify the inference that price information will neces-

sarily be used to stabilize prices." 96 Justice Marshall illustrates the
prerequisites for the application of a per se rule by reference to
Professor Turner's two classes of cases: (1) where a practice is always
economically harmful; i.e., it can serve only to lessen competition;
or (2) where a practice is sometimes harmful, sometimes neutral and
sometimes beneficial, but "the aggregate of harm in situations in which
it is harmful far outweighs the aggregate of benefit in situations in
which it makes a beneficial contribution as to the working of the
market." 97 In his view, the facts before the Court fall in neither of
these categories and hence should be deemed unlawful only upon a
factual showing of illegality, which he finds lacking here.
The basic issue in all branches of antitrust is the extent to which
extrinsic facts can be examined without making enforcement so difficult as to be unadministrable. I have been critical of the Court's
resort in the past to techniques of presumption and assumption, 8 as
well as its creation of new per se rules in invalidating horizontal and
95 Id. at 342.

96 Id. at 343.
97 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT POLICY 143 (1959). Justice Marshall's paraphrase
is as follows: "If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree,
then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases." 393 US. at 341 (dissent).
98 See, e.g., Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual
Antitrust Review, 57 CALi. L. Rxv. 182, 202-07 (1969).
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vertical mergers.99 It has been my belief that ease of enforcement has
been placed too high in the Court's scale of legal and social values.
I believe, however, along with Justice Douglas, that price is too critical
and sensitive a factor to premise the illegality of exchange agreements
on the prosecution's ability to prove a wrongful motive, intent or purpose or to demonstrate an adverse effect on the movement of prices.
Consequently, I would hold such agreements presumptively unlawful
with the burden of justification shifting to the defendants. As a practical matter, this may be tantamount to saying that such agreements
are unlawful per se. 100 A contrary rule, however, could well open the
door to evasion and impede the effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws, particularly in heavily concentrated industries. By stating the
rule in presumptive terms we retain a degree of flexibility enabling
us to uphold those arrangements in their peculiar market contexts
where the aggregate of social benefit far outweighs the theoretical
dangers of economic detriment.' 0 '
One troublesome aspect of Container Corp. is its potential effect
on the availability of the "meeting competition" defense' 02 in Robinson-Patman cases. Defendants stressed this problem in the Supreme
Court, arguing that, under Robinson-Patman, sellers often have a
duty to verify customer reports of competitive offers and that the
application of a per se rule of illegality would accordingly be inappropriate.1 03 The district court, moreover, had found that, on occasion,
container customers had supplied defendants with "incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading information as to prices offered by competing
suppliers."'10 4 It accordingly held that since defendants sometimes requested information to verify customers' reports, their conduct was
designed "to prevent the perpetration of a fraud upon them"'105 and
thus fell within the rule of Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States.10 6
Justice Douglas rejected these assertions out of hand, stating
99 See, e.g., Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws (From the Viewpoint of the Critic), 34 ABA A-riusr L.J. 21, 32-39 (1967).
100 In the trade association field certain acts have been proscribed because of their

inherent danger to competition, even though arguably they do not in fact restrain trade.
Frequently in the law we prohibit acts which fall within a penumbra of legality in order
to make more effective the condemnation of dearly undesirable conduct.
101 Cf. FrC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.

568, 595-96 (1967) (Harlan, J.,

concurring).
Clayton Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
Brief for Appellees at 42-43, United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 Us.
333 (1969).
104 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 273 F. Supp. 18, 28 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
105 Id. at 61.
106 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
102

103
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merely that the "controlling circumstances" of Cement Manufacturers
were not present.1 07 The distinction he draws, however, between
fraudulent inducements to deliver cement in excess of the buyer's
true needs and fraudulent inducements to obtain containers at unlawfully low prices is far from self-evident, If the inquiries of competitors are limited to instances of overreaching by customers, this
procompetitive purpose might well be deemed sufficient to rebut the
presumptive illegality of the exchange. But apparently this was not
the primary or even the usual purpose of the- exchange in Container
Corp., and hence the decision could not have rested on this narrow
ground.
III
RESURGENCE OF CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM

In a brief per curiam decision, the Supreme Court last term
reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
a treble damage action brought by a retail dealer of cemetery markers
against a manufacturer of such markers and five cemetery companies. The opinion in Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.08 lists eight items of evidence which the Court
believes raised a question of fact on the issue of conspiracy, thus requiring the submission of the case to the jury.109
If all that were involved were the appraisal of the sufficiency of
proof, one would hardly be warranted in taking note of the decision in
a review of recent Supreme Court developments. But read in the light
of last year's Albrecht v. Herald Co.110 decision, the case leads one to
speculate whether the specter of conscious parallelism may not have
been revived.
The facts were these: Plaintiff charged that defendants had conspired to exclude it from and to monopolize the market for bronze
grave markers. The cemeteries had refused to permit plaintiff and
others similarly situated to install on the cemetery grounds markers
sold by them to the plot owners. When markers were purchased from
the cemeteries, no installation fee was charged. But a fee for installation and perpetual care was exacted when markers were bought from
others. Plaintiff maintained that these fees were excessive, unreasonable and unrelated to the actual cost of installation. The cemeteries
107
108
109
110

393 U.S. at 335.
394 U.S. 700 (1969).
Id. at 701-02.
390 US. 145 (1968).
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required all markers to conform to a specific minimum alloy formula
identical to that used by Matthews, the defendant manufacturer.
Markers not purchased from the cemeteries had to be accompanied
by a certificate of analysis, prepared by an independent laboratory,
attesting that their bronze alloy content met the specifications. It was
also proved that Matthews had implicitly suggested such a specification
in a pamphlet distributed to its customers.'
All but one of the cemeteries were Matthews' customers. Although plaintiff charged that the cemeteries purchased their markers
exclusively from Matthews, the evidence showed that some had as
many as fifty percent of a different brand installed on their grounds;
a composite reading of total market installation in all of the cemeteries
showed at least thirty percent of different manufacture. 12
On the other hand, there was evidence that three of the defendant
cemeteries had attempted to dissuade plot owners from buying markers from plaintiff." 3 Plaintiff also pointed to the fact that several of
the cemetery defendants had adopted a number of practices, suggested
by Matthews in its pamphlet, which allegedly erected barriers to retailers competing with the cemeteries. 114 There was also evidence of
frequent visits to and conferences with the cemeteries by sales representatives of Matthews."15 These meetings, however, were found to
have involved only "business calls," and plaintiff admitted that it had
no evidence that representatives of the cemeteries met with one another or had any discussions among themselves."10
Rather than instituting a series of separate suits against the cemeteries and Matthews complaining against their vertical arrangements,
plaintiff brought one action alleging a horizontal conspiracy among
all the defendants. The sole issue on defendants' motion for summary
judgment, therefore, was whether the evidence relied upon raised a
7
triable issue of fact as to the existence of a horizontal conspiracy.l
The Fourth Circuit, by a divided decision, affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.1 8 The Supreme Court, without
Il' 394 U.S. at 701-02.
112 Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 1, 3
(E.D. Va. 1967).
113 894 US. at 702.
114 Id.
'15 Id.

116 Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 404 F.2d 1008,
1010 (4th Cir. 1968).
17 290 F. Supp. 1 (EJD. Va. 1967).
118 404 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1968).
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the benefit of full-scale briefs or oral argument on the merits, granted
certiorari and vacated the court of appeals' judgment." 9
The opinion notes the district court's finding that the rules relating to alloy content and installation were reasonable in view of the
continuing obligation of perpetual care imposed on the cemeteries in
their contracts with plot owners. 120 The Court asserts, however, that
the question of their reasonableness was one of fact for resolution by
the jury.121 The Matthews pamphlet, suggesting standards for cemetery
regulations, which plaintiff alleged was evidence of an agreement to
participate in restrictive practices, was treated in a similar fashion .122
As far as the installation fees were concerned, the district court's finding that the wide divergence of prices completely negated any pricefixing was held to be beside the point. Since the complaint did not
allege that uniform fees were exacted but that they were "excessive
and unreasonable" for the purposes of injuring the plaintiff, the inferences to be drawn therefrom by a jury were not necessarily dispelled
by their disparity. 23 Finally, the failure to produce any direct written
evidence of conspiracy among the defendants did not preclude a jury
finding of joint action, since "business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer agreement."' 2 4
I would certainly have no quarrel with a ruling that, on the evidence presented, a jury could reasonably find that each of the cemeteries had combined separately with Matthews, putting aside the
question of whether such vertical combinations would be unlawful.
But where is the evidence of a horizontal agreement among the
cemetery defendants? Treating the record facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, all that appears is proof of similar exclusionary conduct on the part of the cemeteries connected only by the suggestion of
some of such practices in the Matthews pamphlet and the fact that
Matthews sales representatives visited the various cemeteries on business calls.
Since the Supreme Court's opinion is truncated, it is difficult to
discuss precisely what theory is relied upon in ruling that sufficient
evidence was present to permit a jury finding of agreement. Perhaps
the Court construes the Matthews pamphlet as a tacit invitation to
119 394 US. 700 (1969).
120 Id. at 702.
121 Id. at 703.
122 Id.

123 Id. at 703-04.
124 Id. at 704, quoting Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing

Corp., 346 US. 537, 540 (1954).
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each cemetery to join in a horizontal agreement, thus permitting the
invocation of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States125 to infer conspiracy. If such were the case, Norfolk Monument would hardly break
new ground. But how is one to distinguish between an invitation to
conspire and a mere suggestion to follow a certain course of conduct?
Surely the Court is not holding that a seller may not make any marketing suggestions to his customers without running the risk that, if the
suggestion is followed, the customers will be guilty of conspiracy with
one another as well as with him.
One plausible explanation for the Court's decision might be that
it relied on the elusive "doctrine" of conscious parallelism. Indeed,
the petition for certiorari stated one of the questions presented for
review as: "Whether and when agreement can be found in consciously
parallel decisions by competitors to adopt substantially identical exclusionary restrictions with respect to installation and sale of grave
markers, contrary to the Sherman Antitrust Act."'128
The tortuous history of conscious parallelism need not be recounted in detail. Suffice it to say that, in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,12 7 the Court plainly held that
consciously parallel conduct is not the substantive equivalent of conspiracy and that evidence of such conduct cannot support a directed
verdict for the plaintiff. Although Theatre Enterprises did not decide
whether proof of uniform conduct without more was sufficient to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff, subsequent court of appeals decisions squarely held that such evidence was insufficient to sustain a
finding of conspiracy or to require the submission of the case to the
128
jury.
What makes Norfolk Monument particularly disquieting, among
other things, is that, if it indeed does reverse the trend of decision on
the conscious parallelism question, it fails to grapple directly with the
issue. After all, there may be many valid reasons why competitors,
faced with identical market conditions, might unilaterally decide to
make the same response. It would be one thing if the common response
made no business or economic sense-for example, a price increase in
125 506 U.S. 208 (1959).
126 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn
Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 US. 700 (1969). The petition also presented three other
questions for review.
127 346 US. 537 (1954).
128 Winchester Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 324 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1963); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
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the face of excess capacity and declining demand129-but quite another if it were perfectly consistent with the self-interest of everyone
concerned. 18 0 To predicate a conspiracy solely on the fact that businessmen, knowing what their competitors were doing, took the same action
would be to place unwarranted restrictions on business decisions and
throttle normal competitive behavior.
Moreover, our discomfort is aggravated when Norfolk's implica13 1
tions are assessed in the context of last year's Albrecht v. Herald Co.
decision, where Justice White, in dictum, suggested that a combination in violation of section 1 could be made out among the defendant
newspaper, all of its dealers who agreed to abide by a maximum resale
price, and the plaintiff-dealer's customers who benefited by the price
restriction. The dilution of the standards for proof of conspiracy which
the Albrecht dictum and the Norfolk Monument decision appear to
portend may well become a genuine threat to fairness in the ad132
ministration of justice.
A claim of conspiracy involves criminal as well as civil liability.
The evidentiary rules concerning the proof of conspiracy permit the
charge to be sustained by evidence which would be incompetent in an
ordinary trial. As Justice Jackson warned twenty years ago, the procedural disadvantages confronting defendants in conspiracy cases are
so enormous that there is an ever-present danger that innocent. people
may be convicted of crimes they never committed. 13 3 Moreover, the
consequences of a conviction for conspiracy as well as a civil judgment
based thereon are far-reaching. 13 4 Certainly in the interest of justice
129 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810-11 (1946).
180 See Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, 3 ABA ANrmusT SECnON 38,
44-45 (1953); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 MacH. L. REv. 59, 85
(1964); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 THE Racoan or N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 173
(1954).
131-390 U.S. 145 (1968). See Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-TwentyFirst Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALiF. L. REV. 182 (1969). Two recent court of appeals
decisions rejecting the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as applied to a corporation's
divisions suggest that further extensions of the new notions of conspiracy in the Supreme
Court's decisions of the past two terms are likely to be stoutly resisted. Cliff Food Stores,
Inc. v. Kroger, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969).
132 There is another aspect of Norfolk Monument which merits comment. I have
difficulty with the procedure, increasingly adopted by the Court in recent years, of
reversing important cases per curiam on the merits without the benefit of briefs and oral
argument on the merits. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Handler, Through
the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALI. L. REv.
182, 202 (1969).
133 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (concurring opinion).
134 See, e.g., Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
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we do not want heavy penalties to be imposed upon those who are
guilty of nothing more than parallel behavior.
I do not take issue with the doctrine that conscious parallelism,
together with various "plus" factors, warrants the submission of the
issue of conspiracy to a jury. Nor do I quarrel with Interstate Circuit,
which permits an inference of conspiracy from evidence of a joint
invitation to participate in a tacit agreement, if indeed such an invitation is clearly made out. I do question, however, a redefinition of
combination and conspiracy and a diminution in the requirements of
proof which will stigmatize, as conspiratorial, conduct falling short
of the agreement which every conspiracy presupposes. 135 Obviously,

the agreement need not be express or in writing. It can be proved
circumstantially and inferred or implied from a course of dealing.13 6
But, in my opinion, a redefinition of conspiracy which excludes the
consensual element can only result in the imposition of liability upon
those who are innocent of any antitrust wrongdoing. Even assuming
the illegality of the vertical agreements, five separate illegal contracts
are not the equivalent of a horizontal conspiracy absent any showing
that they were part and parcel of an integrated plan, scheme, or common course of action.
IV
A DECENT PUBLIC BURIAL FOR LICENSEE ESTOPPEL

In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 3 7 the Supreme Court at long last has
given the century-old doctrine of licensee estoppel a "decent public
burial."' 38 The estoppel concept had been so emasculated by a series
of exceptions that its explicit obliteration comes as no surprise to the

patent and antitrust bars.
135 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 387 (1951);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939); Theatre Enterprises, Inc.
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
136 No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. Often
crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts of the person accused and
done in pursuance of a criminal purpose. . . . The essential combination or
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing
or other circumstances as well as in an exchange of words. United States v.
Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85 [1920]. Where the circumstances are such as to

warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 828 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946).
137 895 U.S. 653 (1969).
138 MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 416 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The erosion process commenced with Westinghouse Electric 6Manufacturing Co. v. FormicaInsulation Co. 139 in 1924. In that case,
the assignor of a patent, in defense of an infringement suit brought
by his assignee, was permitted to cite prior art to narrow the scope of
the patent claims. Since the patent's validity was not directly challenged, the Court could pay lip service to the estoppel while disregarding its fundamental purpose. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co. 140 the assignor relied upon a prior expired patent that
relegated the invention in suit to the public domain and thus was
held to be available to him as well as to everyone else. The so-called
"antitrust" exception first appeared in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co.,141 where a licensee was not precluded from contesting
the validity of his licensor's patent where the patentee sought to enforce a price-fixing provision in the license, the legality of which
hinged upon the existence of a valid patent.
The Sola exception was expanded in Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co. 142 and MacGregor v. Westinghouse
Electric & Manufacturing Co. 143 to cover suits for unpaid royalties
where no effort was made to obtain enforcement of the price clause. It
was this extension which led Justice Frankfurter in dissent to suggest
that "if all the cases which have recognized and applied the doctrine of
estoppel have been reduced, as apparently they have been, to derelicts,
they should not be allowed to remain as obstructions on the stream of
144
the law.'
In 1950, however, the Court, in Automatic Radio Manufacturing
Co. v. Hazeltine Research, In.,'45 appeared to reverse this trend. Justice Minton there upheld the estoppel against a licensee absent a
showing of misuse. Justices Douglas and Black contended in dissent
that there could be no "worse enlargement of monopoly... than the
attachment of a patent to an unpatentable article."'14 Reasoning that

it is often the licensee who is in the best position to appraise the
patent's validity, they contended that the estoppel doctrine should be
discarded in order that the public be rid of "stale or specious
patents."147
266
326
317
329

140
141
142
143
144

US. 342 (1924).
US. 249 (1945).
US. 173 (1942).
U.S. 394 (1947).
329 US. 402 (1947).
Id. at 413 (dissent).

145

339 U.S. 827 (1950).

'39

146 Id. at 839 (dissent).
147 Id. at 840 (dissent).
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It was in this context that the Supreme Court decided Lear. Justice Harlan's opinion for the majority exhibits the scholarship, candor
and painstaking attention to detail which characterize his juristic art.
Although he admits that he is not "writing upon a clean slate," 148 and
that the roots of the estoppel doctrine "have often been celebrated in
tradition,"' 149 he is able to find but one case where it was invoked "in
a considered manner,"'u ° and that thirty-five years before the passage
of the Sherman Act. Automatic Radio, he observes, was decided "without prolonged analysis"'151 and seemingly ignored the fact that, since
1905,12 "each time a patentee sought to rely upon his estoppel privilege before this Court, the majority created a new exception to permit
judicial scrutiny into the validity of the Patent Office's grant."' 1 3
The. opinion carefully reviews each of the cases in which exceptions to the estoppel rule were created, and in every instance concludes
that the rationale underlying the exception applies with equal force
to the doctrine itself.' 54 The origins of estoppel, the Justice points out,
are to be found in "the law of contracts [which] forbids a purchaser
to repudiate his promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied
with the bargain he has made."'1 5 Citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.155 and Cornpco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,157 however, he
notes that "federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation
be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid
patent." 5 8
148 395
149 Id.

US. at 662.
at 663.
150 Id., citing Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856).
151 395 US. at 664.

United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 US. 310 (1905).
395 U.S. at 664.
154 In Formica "the patentee's equities were far more compelling than those presented
in the typical licensing arrangement," since it was his grantor who questioned the scope
of the patent. Id. To the Justice the Formica result was an anomaly: "If a patent had
some novelty," the assignor could defend an infringement suit by narrowing its claim;
"if a patent had no novelty at all, the old owner could not defend successfully since he
would be obliged to launch" a direct attack on validity. Id. at 665.
Justice Harlan believes that it is impossible to limit the Scott Paper doctrine to its
narrow holding. He reasons that if patent policy forbids estoppel when an assignor
attempts to cite a prior expired patent, why should not the doctrine also apply when an
attempt is made "to show that the invention lacked novelty because it could be found
in a technical journal or because it was obvious to one knowledgeable in the art." Id.
at 666. The antitrust exception, developed in the Supreme Court in Sola, Katzinger and
MacGregor, likewise is "profoundly antithetic to the principles underlying estoppel." Id.
152
153

155 Id. at 668.

156 376 US. 225 (1964).
157 376 US. 234 (1964).
158 395 US. at 668.
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Justice Harlan then analyzes the "typical" licensing arrangement
and notes that the licensee obtains both freedom from expensive infringement actions and some freedom from competition by unlicensed
third parties in return for his royalty payments. 1 9 He acknowledges
that "[u]nder ordinary contract principles the mere fact that some
benefit is received is enough to require the enforcement of the [license]
.

. . ,

regardless of the validity of the underlying patent." 160 How-

ever, he states that it does not seem "unfair" to require the patentee to
defend his patent when his licensee places its validity in issue,
"especially since the licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption
of validity."' 161 Concluding that estoppel is not "compelled by the
spirit of contract law," the Court rules that it must yield to "the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the
use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain,"'16 2 thus
explicitly overruling Automatic Radio.163
Were we writing on a clean slate, we might well hold licensees to
their bargains. It is difficult to comprehend why one who has contracted for the privilege of practicing an invention without fear of an
infringement suit should be permitted to negate the patent's validity.
Similarly, why should one who received value for the transfer of his
patent be free to challenge its integrity? It is questionable whether
the forces of competition are really undermined if everyone save the
assignor is free to attack the patent with only the assignor precluded
from practicing the invention which he himself has sold. The usual
warranties demanded of a seller provide a compelling analogy.
But, as Justice Harlan points out, the slate is not clean. The
numerous exceptions which the Court has promulgated over the years,
combined with the thin origins of the estoppel doctrine itself, left the
Court with the choice of uprooting the principle or attempting to
rationalize an increasingly complex set of rules which confused more
than enlightened the bar and the business community. There comes
a time when the exception becomes the rule and when certainty outweighs precedent. That was the situation in Lear.
My first reaction on reading Lear was that there was an element
of unfairness in permitting the licensee to have the benefits of two
worlds-to retain his license agreement, which provided him with immunity against a claim of infringement, and at the same time to put
159 Id. at 669.
160 Id.

161 Id. at 670.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 671.
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the validity of the patent in issue when sued for unpaid royalties. It
seemed to me that morality required him to pay for what he bought.
I thought that the appropriate rule would have been to permit the
licensee to terminate the license agreement on the ground of the alleged invalidity of the licensor's patent and to take his chances in an
infringement suit. Under such an approach the licensee would be
estopped to deny validity so long as he retained the fruits of the license,
but he could escape the inhibiting effects of estoppel by bringing the
agreement to an end, regardless of its termination provisions. On reflection, however, I have concluded that the differences between this
approach and that adopted by the Court are not very meaningful as a
practical matter.
Under the revised patent statute a patentee may no longer recover
an infringer's profits, and, except for cases of a wilful invasion of
another's patent rights, the measure of damages in an infringement
suit is recovery of a reasonable royalty.16 4 Hence, there is in the normal
case little difference between a suit in contract for royalties and an
action in tort for infringement. Thus, if the patent is found to be
valid, the licensor will recover the contractual royalties, and be in
the same position as if he had prevailed on a claim of infringement.
The other element of apparent unfairness was the fact that the
licensee, if his challenge of validity proved unfounded, could retain
the shield of his license to safeguard his future use of the patent after
the conclusion of the litigation. But where the licensee refuses to pay
royalties and assails the patent's validity, the patentee should have the
privilege of terminating the license agreement himself and thus foreclose future use of the patent by the licensee. 165
The important point here is that the licensor is in a position to
protect himself by suing for the royalties that have already accrued
and terminating the license for the future. By eliminating the estoppel
in an action for royalties, the public interest is advanced by the encouragement of those best in a position to contest validity 6 6 to subject
the patent to judicial scrutiny and thus rid the economy of the spurious
164 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964). See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank &cMfg. Co.,
282 F.2d 653, 673 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 812 (1961).
165 The distinction between suing for infringement after termination and suit for
unpaid royalties may be academic since the penalty for infringement may be little
more than the recovery of the royalties provided for in the agreement. There is this
difference however: one who practices an invention after his license agreement has been
terminated by the licensor and after the validity of the patent has been upheld could
well be regarded as a wilful infringer and thus subject to the recovery of treble damages.
166 See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 840 (1950)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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patents that are spawned by a Patent Office that continues to be prodigal
in its grant of monopoly privileges. At the same time, the licensee
who decides to cross the Rubicon assumes the risk that if his claims
of invalidity are judicially rejected, he may thereafter be precluded
from practicing the invention.167
V
LICENSES OF

KNow-How

AND TRADE SECRETS UNDER ATTACK

Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." The Supreme Court has discerned in this spacious language a national policy favoring competition
and narrowly limiting permissible monopoly to those writings and
discoveries that comply with the exacting requirements of the copy
right and patent laws. 168 In a sense the Court has thus endowed antitrust with a constitutional dimension. 169

Five years ago, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.170 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,7 1 the Court held that under
the doctrine of federal preemption and by virtue of the supremacy
clause 172 the states were powerless to forbid product simulation resulting in widespread public confusion even where the imitated features
167 One of the recommendations of the Johnson Antitrust Task Force would involve
compulsory licensing of patents to qualified applicants on equivalent terms whenever a
patentee has issued at least one license to another. White House Task Force Report on
Antitrust Policy, in BNA ANTTusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 411, Special Supp.,
pt. II, at 10 (May 27, 1969). I raise the question as worthy of exploration as to whether,
by limiting recovery of damages to the royalties which the patentee is obtaining from
others, we may not already have taken an important step in the direction of compulsory
licensing.
168 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 895 U.S. 653, 677 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
169 The granting of patent monopolies under . . . constitutional authority
represents a very minor exception to the Nation's traditional policy of a competitive business economy, such as is safeguarded by the antitrust laws. When
articles are not patentable and therefore are in the public domain .... to grant
them a legally protected monopoly offends the constitutional plan of a competi-

tive economy ....
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
170 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
171 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
172 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, c. 2.
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were non-functional and had acquired a secondary meaning identifying the source of the originator's goods. The commentators, as might
have been expected, were in sharp disagreement as to the thrust of
these rulings. Some thought that they neither added to nor subtracted
from existing law.173 Others, 174 including myself,1 75 were disturbed
by the implications of the new principle if carried to the limits of its
logic.
In 1964, commenting upon these decisions, I raised the question
whether they would affect the continued recognition of enforceable
rights in trade secrets and know-how since both are unpatented and
frequently unpatentable.17 The state and federal courts, however,
save for a single dictum, 77 continued to protect trade secrets, finding
nothing in the Sears and Compco rationale compelling any other
course. 7 8 At least one writer, on the other hand, expressed the view
173 E.g., Leeds, Product Simulation: A Right Or a Wrong?, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1179
(1964); Leeds, The Impact of Sears and Compco, 55 TRADEmARK REI. 188 (1965); Treece,
Patent Policy and Preemption:The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 80 (1964).
174 E.g., Chapman, The Supreme Court and Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 54
TRADEmARK REP. 573 (1964); Derenberg, Product Simulation: A Right Or a Wrong?, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1192 (1964).
175 Handler, Product Simulation:A Right Or a Wrong?, 64 CoLutr. L. REV. 1183 (1964).
176 Id. at 1189-90.
177 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th

Cir. 1965).
178 Indeed of the 85 cases in which these precedents have been cited, in 24 they
were distinguished and held inapplicable: Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65,
70 (8th Cir. 1968); Troy Co. v. Products Research Co., 339 F.2d 364, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 930 (1965); Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716,
724 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized
Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); Marcal Paper
Mills, Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 290 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.NJ. 1968); Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee
Imports, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 835, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark
Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383, 887 (ND. Ill. 1966); Bogene Inc. v. Whit-Mor Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp. 126, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416,
431-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); AMCO Eng'r Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. 609 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp.
578, 581-82 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Charlton Publications, Inc., 243
F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 243 F.
Supp. 1, 7-8 (W.D. Ky. 1964); Plastics Research & Dev. Corp. v. Norman, 243 Ark. 780,
422 S.W.2d 121, 125 (1967); Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 A.C.A. 26, 33-34,
74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 503-04 (1969); Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods., Inc.,
241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 730, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (1966); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc.,
33 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 212 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Edgar
H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 356, 197 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1965); Red
Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., 50 N.J. 563, 569-70, 236 A.2d 861, 865 (1967); Distillerie
Fili Ramazotti, S.P.A. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 593, 602, 276 N.Y.S.2d 413, 423-24
(Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Ist Dep't 1967); Greater Recording Co. v.
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that Justice Black's reasoning in Sears, as well as the constitutional
plan of a competitive economy, do not allow states to protect rights
in trade secrets in a patentable process for a period longer than the
federal statutory limit.1 70 Others argued in favor of the power of state
courts to protect secret information from industrial espionage, breach
of confidence and downright fraud.180 An intermediate position has
Stambler, 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records,
Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 880, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
Emenee Indus., Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 311, 311-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
In 28 cases they were followed on essentially the same state of facts: Smith v. Chanel,
Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 564 n.6 (9th Cir. 1968); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta,
377 F.2d 315, 318-19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 1007 (1967); Hampton v. Blair Mfg.
Co., 374 F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967); Bentley v. Sunset House
Distributing Corp., 359 F.2d 140, 146-47 (9th Cir. 1966); Automation Devices, Inc. v.
Smalenberger, 346 F.2d 288, 289 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 974 (1966); Cable
Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 350-51 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965); Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1964); Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Remco Industries,
Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 952 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 397 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1968); Gethers v. Blatty, 283 F. Supp. 303, 307 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. 356, 357 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Eastern
Gas & Fuel Associates, 278 F. Supp. 34, 43 (S.D.W. Va. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 960 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); Brumberger Co. v. Chadwick-Miller Importers,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 190, 191-92 (D. Mass. 1967); Haig & Haig Ltd. v. Maradel Prods., Inc.,
249 F. Supp. 575, 578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Delamere Co. v. Taylor-Bell Co., 249 F. Supp.
471, 478 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); T.P. Laboratories, Inc. v. Huge, 261 F. Supp. 349, 857 (E.D.
Wis. 1965), afl'd, 371 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1966); Gray v. Eskimo Pie Corp., 244 F. Supp.
785, 789 n.3 (D. Del. 1965); G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Lancer Books, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 782,
788 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kingsway, Inc. v. Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102, 103-04 (E.D. Mo. 1964);
Duplex Straw Dispenser Co. v. Harold Leonard & Co., 229 F. Supp. 401, 404-05 (S.D. Cal.
1964); Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964);
Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
of App. 1965); State's Attorney for Prince George's County v. Sekuler, 249 Md. 499, 501-06,
240 A.2d 608, 610-12 (1968); Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass. 623, 626, 205
N.E2d 245, 248 (1965); Natior.-I Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 152 U.S.P.Q. 120, 139, 157
(Mo. 1966); Merchant Suppliers Paper Co. v. Photo-Marker Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 94,
96-97, 285 N.Y.S.2d 932, 985-36 (Ist Dep't 1967); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United
Artists Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 779, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (1st Dep't 1964); Van Prods.
Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 265 n.15, 213 A.2d 769, 778 n.15
(1965).
In only five could it be said that their principle was extended to other circumstances:
Tappan Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F.2d 888, 891-92 (6th Cir. 1967); Spangler Candy
Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641, 645-50 (7th Cir. 1965); Parker Metal Goods
Co. v. R.M.S. Electronics, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 15, 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Piel Mfg. Co. v.
George A. Rolfes Co., 233 F. Supp. 891, 895-96 (S.D. Iowa 1964), afl'd, 363 F.2d 57 (8th
Cir. 1966); In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 862 F.2d 287, 292 (C.C.P.A. 1966). In 28 other
cases, Sears and Compco were mentioned for incidental points only.
179 Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYMGHT LAW SYmposlum 79, 93-96 (1967).
180 See, e.g., R. MiLcRm, TRADE SEcpmrs § 7.08[2][c] (1969); Arnold, A Philosophy
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been advocated confining judicial protection to those secrets which
are incapable of being patented.' 8s
One of the issues in Lear was whether a patentee could assert his
contractual right to receive royalties for the use of the technology
covered by his patent application which had been disclosed and
licensed before the patent issued and while the application was kept
secret.' 8 2 The majority expressed no opinion on this question, remanding it to the California courts for their consideration. 8 3 To three
Justices, however, there was no need for any remand. They found it
clear beyond any peradventure that to permit the licensing of unpatented and unpatentable know-how would subvert the Sears principle and sanction a species of monopoly which the Constitution
neither contemplated nor permits. 8 4 The minority would not go so
far as to deny all rights in secret information; what it condemns is
the collection of royalties for the use of unpatented or unpatentable
inventions. 85
If a know-how license agreement may not be enforced because it
conflicts with the national policy favoring free competition, on what
basis can the secret itself be shielded from wrongful disclosure? Would
not the grant of an injunction or the award of damages sanction a
monopoly in unpatented matter for a period of time which miy be
unlimited? The distinction is difficult to grasp.
On the Protections Afforded By Patent, Trademar, Copyright and Unfair Competition
Law: The Sources & Nature of Product Simulation Law, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 413 (1964);
Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Inposed By Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 H~Av. L. REv. 1432 (1967); Note, The Stiffel Doctrineand the Law of Trade
Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 956 (1968); Note, Trade Secrets Law After Sears and Compco, 53
VA. L. Rzv. 356 (1967); Note, Unfair Competition After Sears and Compco, 22 VAND. L. REv.

129 (1968).
181 Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-Emption-The Aftermath of Sears and
Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFFICE Soc. 713 (1967).
182 395 U.S. at 67475.
183 Id. at 676-77.
184 I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel and Compco
that no State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed
to be a new invention, except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent
Office under the exacting standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery
may, of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under
,hhich self-styled "inventors" do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather
disclose them, in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of
our patent laws, which tightly regulate the kind of invention$ that may be
protected and the manner in which they may be protected. The national policy
expressed in the patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting
monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among individuals, with
or without the approval of the State.
Id. at 677 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id.
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If the controlling principle is that the only permissible monopolies
are those obtained under the patent and copyright laws, many commercially valuable interests may hereafter be bereft of any judicial
protection. Why should this be? Is antitrust our only significant social
goal? What about the national interest in preventing fraud, theft and
breach of confidential relationships? I would hazard the guess that
there are thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of know-how agreements presently in effect which would be invalidated if this minority
view becomes law. Will our competitive institutions really be strength18
ened if such agreements are no longer permitted?
There are very few areas of the law where there are not conflicting lines of authority reflecting competing policy considerations.
Rarely do all the signposts point in the same direction. 8 7 The resolution of conflicting interests is particularly important in trade regulation, where the goal of unfettered competition must be tempered
by the demands of business morality and fair play. 88
In the case of trade secrets, so long as secrecy is maintained, the
owner enjoys a monopoly, but one which is quite fragile, since his
rights must yield to honest discovery by others. The total denial of
rights opens the door to fraud and breach of confidence. Even in an
open society, there are personal, business and state secrets that it is
186 Will the progress of the arts and sciences in fact be promoted by such a rule?
Why is it that compulsory licensing of patents by government edict is deemed procompetitive while the dissemination of technical knowledge by voluntary licensing is
anathema? May not the proposed rule lead to even greater concentration of power in our
economy since there will be every incentive for firms to keep to themselves their technological insights and procedures? If all that is jeopardized is future royalty payments, may
not the prohibition be easily evaded by the requirement of lump-sum payments in advance
of disclosure? If that proves to be the case, what would the change in law accomplish?

Justice Cardozo put it this way:
One principle or precedent, pushed to the limit of its logic, may point to one
conclusion; another principle or precedent, followed with like logic, may point
with equal certainty to another. In this conflict, we must choose between the two
paths, selecting one or other, or perhaps striking out upon a third, which will
be the resultant of the two forces in combination, or will represent the mean
187

between extremes.
CARDozo, supra note 54, at 40.
188 In my discussion of Sears and Compco, I wrote:
There is always the danger that salutary efforts to curb business improprieties
may subvert the competitive process itself. Hence, the courts have had to strike
a delicate balance between the social interest in preserving competition and the
equally important social interest in prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices.
In our eagerness to elevate the ethical levels of business conduct, we must never
forget that unfair competition is the other side of the antitrust coin. To attain

our dual goals, we must eliminate fraud without preventing competition; in preserving competition we must not immunize fraud.
Handler, supra note 175, at 1187.

ANTITRUST: 1969

1970]

not in the public interest to reveal. It is my belief that it is better to
tolerate a qualified monopoly in business secrets to prevent a fraud
than to tolerate a fraud in order to prevent enjoyment of some
monopoly advantages. It should not be impossible to fashion compromises which will give due weight to the competitive ideal without
immunizing espionage or theft. 189 In any event, I can see no reason
why the bargains of those willing to pay money for the disclosure of
valuable technical information should not be upheld. I would hope
that the door which the Lear majority so carefully left open will
eventually be firmly closed against doctrines for which I am unable to
find any social justification.
VI
PATENT MISUSE VERSUS

in Pari Delicto

In Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,Inc.,190 the Court has added
another chapter to the confusing jurisprudence of patent misuse. More
particularly, Justice White's opinion for an eight-Justice majority' 91
raises perplexing questions with respect to how royalty payments in a
patent license agreement may lawfully be measured.
Although the litigation was unusually complex and involved a
host of issues,192 the facts relevant to the patent misuse question were
relatively simple. Hazeltine owned some 500 patents for various types
of radio and television apparatus. 193 Zenith acquired licenses to utilize
Hazeltine's patents in the radios and television sets it manufactured.
In entering into these licenses, it was Hazeltine's policy to insist "upon
acceptance of its standard five-year package license agreement ... re189 Perhaps limits should be imposed on the temporal scope of the monopoly. Maybe
disclosure of the secret should be required, as with patents, after a certain period of
exploitation. Other reasonable restrictions might be imposed in the interests of competition. But why throw out the baby with the bath on the doctrinaire ground that no
rights are obtainable with regard to anything in the public domain, a thesis which

undermines the law of trademarks and unfair competition and could lead to the unenforceability of all ancillary agreements in restraint of trade, to say nothing of the
traditional restrictions that are commonplace in all commercial contracts? See, eg., Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 MICH. L. REv. 351 (1964); Ladas,
Legal Protection of Know-How, 7 IDn, 397 (1963).
190 395 US. 100 (1969).
191 Justice Harlan filed a separate opinion, 395 Us. at 141, dissenting on the patent
misuse issue.
192 Among the other issues decided were the susceptibility to judgment of a subsidiary

never served with process, the standard of proof of treble-damages, and the propriety of
injunctive relief.
193 395 US. at 134.
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serving royalties on the licensee's total radio and television sales,
irrespective of whether the licensed patents were actually used in the
products manufactured."' 94 Zenith declined to renew the license when
it expired. Negotiations having proved fruitless, Hazeltine brought
suit for patent infringement. Zenith thereupon raised a patent misuse
defense and, in addition, counterclaimed for treble damages and injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that Hazeltine's insistence on
royalties for sales of sets produced without practicing the patented
inventions violated the antitrust laws.10 5
The district court found for Zenith on the infringement issue 91 6
and, on the antitrust counterclaim, ruled that Hazeltine "had misused
its domestic patents by attempting to coerce Zenith's acceptance of a
five-year package license, and by insisting on extracting royalties from
unpatented products."'1 97 Treble damages were awarded, as well as an
injunction prohibiting Hazeltine from "[c]onditioning... the grant of
a license.., to ...Zenith... upon the paying of royalties on the manufacture, use or sale of apparatus not covered by such patent."1 1g8
On appeal of the damage and injunction judgments, 99 the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the damage award 20 0 but modified the injunction to strike the above-quoted prohibition. 201 According to the court
of appeals, the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 20 2 established that it

was not misuse to condition the grant of a patent license upon payment
of royalties on unpatented products; 203 and, since there was no patent
204
misuse, there obviously could be no antitrust infraction.
On the misuse issue,20 5 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"conditioning the grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties
on products which do not use the teaching of the patent does amount
20 6
to patent misuse.
194 Id.

195 Id. at 104-05. The counterclaim also alleged conspiracies with foreign patent
pools to exclude Zenith and others from exporting to certain foreign markets. Id. at 105.
196 239 F. Supp. 51, 68-69 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
197

395 US. at 105.

198 Id. at 133-34 (emphasis by the Court).
199 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
200 The court of appeals' affirmance was, inter alia, of damages with respect to the
patent misuse claim. Id. at 33-35.
201 Id. at 39.
202 339 US. 827 (1950).
203 See 395 U.S. at 135.
204 See id.
205 The Court does not pass on the question of antitrust violation, remanding that
issue for further consideration by the court of appeals. Id. at 14041.
206 Id. at 135.
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Justice White's reasoning is quite simple. Just as a patentee may
not condition a license on the licensee's purchase of an unpatented
product 20 7 or charge a royalty for use of the invention after the patent
has expired, 208 so too a requirement that the licensee pay royalties on
sales of goods totally unrelated to the patent results in the use of "the
power of [the] patent to levy a charge for making, using or selling
products not within the reach of the monopoly granted by the Govern209
ment."
Nor is the Court troubled by an apparent inconsistency with the
holding of Automatic Radio. Justice White reads that decision as establishing only that the licensor and licensee may, in the interest of
mutual convenience, agree to measure royalties by a percentage of the
licensee's total sales. He sees nothing wrong in a voluntary undertaking by the licensee to pay royalties for the privilege of using the
licensor's patents even if he fails to exercise that privilege. But he
would distinguish an arrangement arrived at after arm's length bargaining from the circumstances present in Zenith-a blanket insistence by the licensor on the total-sales royalty as a condition of granting any license at all.210 In Justice White's language, "if convenience
of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total-sales royalty
provision, there are no misuse of the patents and no forbidden con21
ditions attached to the license." '
Although ruling that Hazeltine's insistence on a total-sales royalty
constituted patent misuse, Justice White nevertheless does not uphold
the district court's injunction against the practice granted on Zenith's
counterclaim. Rather, he notes that the court of appeals had not reviewed the factual finding on which the injunction was predicated,
so that a remand for that purpose was necessary.2 12 More significantly
for our purposes, the opinion carefully points out that the existence
of patent misuse does not necessarily mean that there is an actual or
207 E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 892, 395-96 (1947); Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 809 US. 486, 455-59 (1940).
208 E.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
209 395 US. at 137.
210 But we do not read Automatic Radio to authorize the patentee to use the
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to override protestations
of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for
some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire to purchase the privileges
of the patent. In such event, not only would royalties be collected on unpatented
merchandise, but the obligation to pay for nonuse would dearly have its source
in the leverage of the patent.
Id. at 139.
211
212

Id. at 188.
Id. at 140.
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threatened violation of the antitrust laws213 sufficient to warrant an
injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act.
21 4
When Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.
was decided last year, I was troubled by whether the total rejection of
in pan delicto as an antitrust defense implied a repudiation of the
unclean hands defense in patent litigation based on the patentee's
misuse of his grant. Hazeltine confirms the conclusion I had reached
that it is consistent with basic antitrust policy to expunge in pan
delicto while retaining the doctrine of patent misuse in our antitrust
and patent jurisprudence.
To restate the Perma Life holding briefly,2 15 the in pari delicto
defense is not generally available in a treble-damage action to immunize a defendant from his antitrust transgressions because the plaintiff, as well, has violated the law. Rather, each party has its remedy for
the other's misdeeds. 216 On the other hand, once a patent owner is

,found guilty of misuse, his improper conduct constitutes a complete
defense to an action for infringement, notwithstanding the fact of the
infringing party's plainly unlawful behavior.
Despite the seeming difference in results, the basic goal of both
the patent misuse and the in pari delicto doctrines is essentially the
same, namely, the promotion of the nation's policy against monopoly
and the restriction of competition. Both rules are designed to
strengthen antitrust enforcement. As explained by the Supreme Court,
once a patentee moves beyond the metes and bounds of his patent
grant, he encroaches upon "domains where the antitrust acts or other
laws, not the patent statutes, define the public policy. '217 Chief Justice
Stone put it this way:
[T]he public policy which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the inven213 And if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the
misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the
Sherman Act, or that Zenith was threatened by a violation so as to entitle it to
an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act.
Id., citing Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641
(1947); Morton Salt Co. v. GS. Suppiger Co., 314 US. 488, 490 (1942); Laitram Corp.
v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
214 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
215 For an extended discussion of this aspect of Perma Life, see Handler, Through
The Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALI. L. REV.
182, 197 (1969).
216 As pointed out in Handler, supra note 215, at 200-01, it is not clear that Perma
Life totally expunges in pari delicto from antitrust. There may still be limited occasions
for application of the doctrine.
217 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 US. 661, 666 (1944).

ANTITRUST: 1969

1970]

tion. [That policy] forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to [the] public [interest] to grant.21 8
In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co. 2 19 the misuse defense
was fashioned to prevent the use of the patent monopoly as leverage
to control unpatented goods utilized in practicing a patented process
or in connection with a patented article or machine. The Court invalidated the tie-in, without pausing to determine whether it offended
against the requirements of the antitrust laws. Its reason was that the
misuse of the patent concerned "the public interest as well as the
private interests of suitors." 220 Accordingly, the patentee was to be
denied relief against infringement on the theory that his trespass into
the antitrust domain constituted unclean hands. The Court was of
the view that enforcement of the patent would reward the patentee
in its efforts to restrain competition in the market for the tied, unpatented product, and thus be "a contributory factor in thwarting the
public policy underlying the grant of the patent." 221 The Court did
not assess the gravity of the patentee's misconduct against that of the
defendant's infringement. As one court has put it:
The defense, once established, does not require any ...

bal-

ancing of the public interest; once patent misuse has been shown,
the public interest ...

requires that the action for infringement

222
of the patent must fall.

One can readily understand why the courts would not tolerate the
use of the limited patent monopoly to obtain a competitive advantage
in the marketing of unpatented goods, though at the time of Morton
Salt one might have questioned why the standard of legality of a tie-in
should have been more stringent under general patent law than under
the antitrust laws. In the present antitrust climate towards tie-ins and
similar restrictive practices, 223 however, not even the lantern of Diogenes could discern any signal differences between the standards now
applicable to both fields. In upholding the defense, the courts in effect
are granting an immunity to the infringer.
In Perma Life, on the other hand, in denying the in pari delicto
defense, the Court made it plain that the miscreant plaintiff, though
218 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
219 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
220 Id. at 493.
221 Id.

222 Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp. of Am., 222 F. Supp. 332, 336
(si. Cal. 1963).
223 See text at notes 1-53 supra.
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allowed a treble-damages recovery, could himself be mulcted by a counterclaim interposed by the defendant, if he had standing to prosecute
the plaintiff's infraction, or by litigation instituted by others, including the enforcement agencies of the government. 224
By a parity of reasoning, the Court could have sanctioned a
counterclaim based on the patentee's antitrust transgressions or making the plaintiff amenable, like every other businessman, to the multiple remedies provided by our various antitrust laws, without barring
the infringement action because of the plaintiff's own misconduct.
Were the antitrust claimant to be shown the door, the public
would lose the advantages thought to result from the enforcement of
antitrust by private litigation. The private suitor is not merely obtaining redress of a wrong inflicted upon himself; as a guardian of the
public interest he serves as the vicarious avenger of a public wrong.2 25
The Supreme Court finds no like public interest in the vindication of the patent grant by judgment halting the infringement. The
infringer is providing competition-an ease to the people 22 6-- against
a monopoly that has been improperly exploited. The denial of relief
serves as punishment for the patentee's abuse of power. What is more,
it is a deterrent against similar misconduct by other patent owners.
In short, an immunity against an antitrust dereliction runs counter to
our antitrust objectives while the immunity against infringement advances the cause of competition.
With this background, let us turn to Zenith itself. With respect
to patent misuse, the decision raises essentially two questions. First,
how may the royalties payable for a patent license properly be measured? And second, what is the relationship between a finding of
patent misuse and the requirements for a substantive violation of the
392 U.S. at 139.
The Supreme Court has often stated that the private antitrust action plays an
important role in antitrust enforcement. The following statement in Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947) is typical.
Where the interests of individuals or private groups or those who bear a special
relation to the prohibition of a statute are identical with the public interest
in having a statute enforced, it is not uncommon to permit them to invoke sanctions. This stimulates one set of private interest to combat transgressions by
another without resort to governmental enforcement agencies. Such remedies
have the advantage of putting back of such statutes a strong and reliable motive
for enforcement, which relieves the Government of cost of enforcement. . . . It
is clear Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement
and to arm injured persons with private means to retribution when it gave to any
injured party a private cause of action in which his damages are to be made good
threefold ....
Id. at 751-52.
226 See The Schoolmaster Case, Y.B., 11 Hen. IV, F.47, pl. 21 (Common Pleas 1410).
224

225
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antitrust laws? For convenience it seems appropriate to discuss the
latter issue first.
Since the misuse doctrine, as I have noted, 27 is a branch of the
unclean hands principle applicable only as a defense when the patentee
seeks judicial enforcement of his patent, the issue is not whether
there has been an antitrust transgression, but whether the patent has
been employed as an improper means of obtaining monopoly advantages in fields outside the scope of the grant. The courts have uniformly held that a patent owner's anticompetitive conduct need not
rise to the level of an antitrust violation for the defense to be available. 228 And, in Zenith, Justice White affirmed this principle by re-

manding for consideration of the antitrust issue after holding that
patent misuse was present. 229
This rule appears eminently sound, as a simple example will
demonstrate. Extending the payment of license royalties beyond the
life of the patent has consistently been held to constitute misuse280
because the patentee is plainly utilizing his patent position to reap a
reward beyond that provided him by the patent law. 23 1 But there may
be many instances in which the anticompetitive impact of such a royalty
arrangement will not be sufficiently grave to warrant a finding of independent antitrust illegality. As Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.28 2 established, the parameters of a
patent are not necessarily coextensive with a relevant product market,
so that attempted extension of the patent monopoly, without more,
will not establish, ipso facto, an attempt to monopolize in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
What about the converse situation? Suppose an antitrust infraction involving a patent is clearly established. Does a finding of misuse
necessarily follow such a determination? The lower courts have gen227

See text at note 217 supra.

E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 US. 488, 494 (1942); Berlenbach
v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 829 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US. 830 (1964);
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 US. 894 (1959); Barber-Colman
Co. v. National Tool CO., 53 U.S.P.Q. 311 (NJD. Ohio 1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cr.
228

1943).
229 895 U.S. at 14041.

230 E.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 319 US. 29 (1964); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
231 Justice White stated the principle as follows in Zenith: "[A] patentee may not
use the power of his patent to levy a charge for making, using, or selling products not
within the reach of the monopoly granted by the Government." 395 US. at 136-37.
232 382 Us. 172 (1965). See Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust PolicymakingNineteenth Annual Review, 76 YAx L.J. 92, 110 (1966).
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23 3
emily answered in the affirmative on the basis of a fortiori reasoning.
And again, this result seems appropriate. Examination of the various

practices which have been held to constitute misuse

23 4

suggests, at least

to me, that it is hard to conceive of any antitrust violation in which
the leverage provided by a patent plays a significant part which would
not, at the same time, amount to an extension of the patent monopoly
within the misuse framework.
One further aspect of the misuse doctrine in general merits comment. The defense is absolute; if misuse is proved, the infringement
suit must fail.23 5 Is such a do-or-die rule just and in keeping with

fundamental notions of fair play?
Most laws would be incapable of enforcement if we had to rely
exclusively upon the direct sanctions which only prosecuting officials
may invoke. The treble damage remedy enlists the aid of private
business and the private bar in effective antitrust enforcement. We
must never overlook the efficacy in law administration of the prophylactic advice the bar provides its clients. The misuse doctrine creates
an indirect sanction of enormous potency. The omnipresent danger
of losing the protection of one's valuable property rights will spur a
most scrupulous compliance with antitrust's requirements no matter
how severe. Sometimes, of course, an indirect sanction can be so potent
as to be self-defeating. This was recognized in Kelly v. Kosuga,23 6
where the Supreme Court refused to uphold a defense, in an action
for the recovery of the purchase price, based upon the seller's antitrust
violations. Had the Court held otherwise, every action for goods sold
and delivered could readily be converted into an antitrust law suit,237

with devastating effects on the conduct of civil litigation in the state
and federal courts.
233 See American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966);
Performed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
US. 846 (1964); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
234 These practices include royalties extending beyond the patent's expiration, e.g.,
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); tying arrangements, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. GS.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); forced package licensing, e.g., Shea v. Blaw-Knox Co.,
388 F.2d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1968) (dictum); vertical price-fixing in more than one license,
e.g., Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956), aff'g 105
F. Supp. 372 (D.N.J. 1952); exclusive dealing arrangements, e.g., P.C. Russell Co. v.
Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1955); discriminatory royalties, e.g.,
Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); and restrictions on use after
sale, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 28-31
(E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
235 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 US. 488 (1942).
236 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
237 See Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 754 (1947).
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While I fully understand the philosophic basis of the patent misuse rule, I am not at all sure that it need take its present Draconian
form. I am not satisfied that so drastic a punishment necessarily fits
the crime in every case. I cannot grasp why the deterrent values of
Morton Salt cannot be achieved without clothing a wilful infringement with complete immunity. Morton Salt itself recognizes the unfairness inhering in its doctrine by making the disqualification temporary only.238 As soon as the consequences of the misuse are dis-

sipated, the patentee's rights revive.
There is, I believe, another approach. Some forty years ago, in
considering the defense of unclean hands in the field of trademark infringement, I had the following to say:
The morals of the situations are curious. In order to penalize the
plaintiff for his misrepresentation, the defendant is not only allowed to go scot free but in effect is licensed to continue his piracy,
for the time being at least. The interest of the public is lost sight
of. The practical way of dealing with this situation would be to
compel both parties to call a halt to their deception instead of
permitting the roguery of one to neutralize that of the other. Or,
if this is not possible under our present procedure, the court could
at least render a conditional decree, enjoining the defendant's infringement upon plaintiff's discontinuance of his misrepresentation,
the decree taking effect only upon the performance of the condition.239
Why would it not make sense to punish with evenhanded justice
both litigants, the defendant for his infringement and the plaintiff
for his patent misuse? Instead of requiring a new suit to be brought
after the effects of the misuse are erased, the court could condition its
judgment of infringement upon proof that the patentee has corrected
his practices, with the decree being operative only so long as the correction persisted. To the extent that the courts grant relief upon a
showing of the abandonment of the misuse, obviating the necessity
for bringing a new suit,240 the modest reform I have suggested is to

a large extent already in effect. I would, of course, go further and
follow the procedures of a conditional decree even where there has
been no abandonment pendente lite. To retain the deterrent effect
of the misuse doctrine, it is not necessary in my view to withhold injunctive relief. That end can be achieved by the denial of any accounting for the past infringement. But I would eschew any rigid rule
238 See Morton Salt Co. v. GS. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
289 Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 89 YALE LJ. 22, 49-50 (1929).
240 E.g., Sylvania Indus. Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.), cert. dis.
missed, 319 U.S. 777 (1943) (allowed supplemental pleadings under Fm. R. Civ. P. 15).
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precluding the recovery of damages under any or all circumstances. I
would restore a sense of balance, weighing the seriousness of the misuse against the gravity and wilfulness of the infringement. By endowing the courts with a measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing
damages for the past infringement, in whole or in part, we would
enable them to adjust the penalty to fit the offense while imposing a
sufficient degree of punishment to retain the deterrent value of this
indirect sanction. In this way, patent misuse would no longer partake
241
of vigilante justice.
Turning to the narrower patent misuse issue in Zenith, precisely
what impact does the ruling have on royalty clauses in patent license
agreements? Perhaps it will be easier to ascertain what the Court has
held by first determining what it has not done.
It seems fairly clear that Justice White does not deem it to be
a patent misuse when a patentee, in licensing a patented machine or
a method of process patent, determines the amount of the royalties to
be paid by a percentage of the gross sales of goods produced under the
patent. Nor is there anything improper under Zenith if the royalties are
computed on sales of unpatented products produced pursuant to a
patented process. In both instances, the licensee's payments are directly related to his practice of the patented invention.
Similarly, the opinion appears to permit the licensor to exact a
minimum flat royalty for the licensee's privilege of practicing the invention if he so desires,24 irrespective of whether or not the patent
is, in fact, used. And I see nothing in Zenith to prohibit the patent
owner from insisting on such an arrangement as a condition of any
license at all.
The problem arises when the sales on which the royalties are to be
measured include goods which are neither covered by the patent nor
produced by a patented process. In that situation, Justice White's rule
turns on the facts surrounding the negotiation of the license. If the
licensee wants the privilege of using one or all of the licensor's patents,
241 "Our law frowns on vigilante justice." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 US. 134, 154 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
242 The Court also said in Automatic Radio that if the licensee bargains for

the privilege of using the patent in all of his products and agrees to a lump sum
or a percentage-of-total-sales royalty, he cannot escape payment on this basis
by demonstrating that he is no longer using the invention disclosed by the patent.
We neither disagree nor think such transactions are barred by the trial court's
injunction.
395 U.S. at 138-39.
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he can lawfully agree to pay royalties based on all of his sales, whether
or not the licensed patent or patents are utilized. Similarly, if the bargaining parties "find it more convenient and efficient . . . to base
royalties on total sales than to face the burden of figuring royalties
based on actual use, '243 there is no misuse in agreeing to such an
arrangement.
What does appear to be forbidden is for the patent owner to
insist, contrary to the licensee's wishes, that the royalties be measured
on all of the licensee's sales, including those of products not involving
the patented invention when the licensee wants only the right to a
specific patent (or package of patents) and is willing to pay royalties
only on sales of products related to the patents he wishes to employ.244
Here the patentee can insist only on a flat sum for the immunity which
the licensee desires.
In short, a licensee can willingly undertake to pay a total-sales
royalty, but the licensor cannot require it as a condition of any license
at all. The Court thus seems to be relying on a doctrine of involuntary
restraint similar to that which I have suggested would be appropriate
245
with respect to tie-ins.
Since involuntary restraints have traditionally been frowned upon
for centuries, 246 there is little theoretical difficulty with such a rule.
However, as Justice Harlan points out in his dissent, 47 the practical
problems of proof will be substantial. How is the trier of fact to determine whether or not the total-sales royalty was actually imposed
against the licensor's will? Is a recitation of mutual convenience in
the agreement itself sufficient to save the royalty? If so, all that has
been accomplished is the judicial imposition of a new boiler plate provision in every patent license utilizing the total-sales device. In short,
Zenith may have given us a theoretically sound principle which in
practice may have little if any real significance.
Id. at 138.
But we do not read Automatic Radio to authorize the patentee to use the
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to override protestations
of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for
some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire to purchase the privileges
of the patent.
243

244

Id. at 139.
245 See text at note 48 supra.
246 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
247 395 US. at 141-42.
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VII
LIMITATIONS

ON THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE

In commenting on United States v. Diebold, Inc. 248 in my 1962
annual review,249 I expressed regret that the Supreme Court, in that
case, did not provide us with a full-dress opinion clarifying the philo-

sophic basis of the failing company doctrine or the criteria to be
250
followed in applying it. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
decided in the 1968 term, does deal with the issue at length, but unfortunately many of the questions I posed seven years ago remain
unanswered. What is most disturbing, however, is the Court's harsh
treatment of the defense. If Citizen Publishing means everything it
says, the failing company doctrine may now be so shackled with unrealistic requirements that, as a practical matter, it has little or no
remaining vitality.
Citizen Publishing raises two distinct questions with.respect to
the failing company doctrine. First, to what antitrust offenses does the

defense apply? Is it limited to mergers and acquisitions challenged
under section 7 of the Clayton Act, or does it also have applicability
to loose-knit combinations and monopolization attacked under the
Sherman Act? Second, what are the substantive elements of the defense?
In Citizen Publishing the government challenged the legality of
a joint operating agreement between the only two daily newspapers
in Tucson, Arizona, one of which had been operated profitably while
the other had sustained consistent losses. 251 When the unprofitable
paper was acquired by new management, rather than seeking to sell
it to others, its new owners negotiated an agreement with the other
publication whereby each retained independent editorial departments, but the circulation and advertising operations of both were

252
jointly run by a new corporation, equally owned by both.

Under the joint agreement, the prices at which the newspapers
were sold and advertising was placed were agreed upon; profits were

pooled; and competing publications by either newspaper or their stock253
holders were prohibited.
248 869 U.S. 654 (1962).
249 Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 IEcopw or
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 427-29 (1962).
250 894 US. 131 (1969).
251 Id. at 133.
252 Id. at 133-34.
253 Id. at 134.
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The complaint challenged the arrangement under both sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Prior to trial, the two newspapers merged,
and the complaint was amended to add a section 7 count as well.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government on the section 1 count 25 4 and, after trial, also found violations
of sections 2 and 7.255 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed,
seven to one,256 with Justice Harlan concurring in the result 257 and
258
Justice Stewart dissenting.
Justice Douglas' opinion commences by stating the not very startling conclusion that horizontal price-fixing, profit pooling and market
limitation constitute per se violations of section 1.259 He then turns
to "the only real defense" raised below-the failing company rule.
The trial court had excluded any evidence with respect to the defense
on the section 1 charge, but had admitted the proffered facts on the
issues of monopolization and section 7 violation. 260 The facts basically
were that one of the newspaper companies, Citizen, was in precarious
financial condition at the time the joint operation agreement was entered into, having averaged over $20,000 a year in losses for the eight
prior years. 261 Moreover, at the time the joint operation was commenced, the Citizen owed $79,000 to its stockholders for advances on
working capital; had liabilities of over $47,000 compared to assets of
262
$16,525; and had only $420 in the bank and $66 on hand.
Justice Douglas finds it unnecessary to determine whether a failing company defense can ever be made out in Sherman Act litigations,
because in his view the fundamental conditions of such a defense were
not proved. To him there are two elements to the defense: the putative failing company must be in hopeless financial straits, and the
competitor which acquires it must be the only available purchaser.
On the question of how weak a company must be before it can
be said that it is failing, the Court is quite strict. Applying the language of InternationalShoe Co. v. FTC,263 Justice Douglas holds that
254 Id.
255 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1967).
256 Justice Douglas' opinion was joined by Justices Black, White, Brennan, Marshall,
and Chief Justice Warren. Justice Fortas did not participate.
257 594 U.S. at 140.
258

Id. at 143.

259 Id. at 135-36.
260

Id. at

261

Id. at 133.
Id. at 144 n.2.
280 US. 291 (1930).

262
263

136.
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failure." 264

Since the
it must face "the grave probability of a business
district court had found that, despite Citizen's poor financial condition, its owners did not contemplate liquidation if a joint arrangement could not be worked out,2 65 Justice Douglas concludes that the

company was not on the verge of going out of business and hence not
a failing company. 266 Moreover, following the lead of Justice Stone's
dissent in International Shoe,267 Justice Douglas goes on to hold that
so long as there is a possibility that the "failing company" could continue to operate under receivership or reorganization, competition
by that company could be maintained without a merger and therefore
its acquisition has anticompetitive effects. The Court's ruling on this
point is explicit and virtually black letter: "[t]he prospects of reorganization of the Citizen in 1940 would have to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company doctrine applicable to this case." 268s
It is not impossible to comprehend why a defendant should be
required to make a satisfactory showing that the acquired company
was indeed on the brink of financial disaster. But to engraft upon such
a requirement the additional burden of establishing that a reorganization or receivership program is not feasible seems unduly onerous.
The variety of possible reorganization schemes available under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act to an insolvent company is dependent upon
a multiplicity of factors which will differ in each case. 26 9 How practical
then is it to compel a prospective purchaser to assess the probability
of a successful reorganization in order to decide whether his acquisition is lawful?
Justice Douglas' second criterion is that the acquiring company
must be the only available purchaser of the failing entity.270 On this

point, the opinion is quite clear:
The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in a
merger or in any other case unless it is established that the company that acquires the failing company or brings it under dominion is the only available purchaser. For if another person or
system would
group could be interested, a unit in the competitive
2
be preserved and not lost to monopoly power. 71
264 394 U.S. at 137, quoting International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 US. 291, 802 (1930).
265 280 F. Supp. at 980.
266 394 U.S. at 137-38.
267 280 U.S. at 306.
268 394 U.S. at 138.
269 Factors such as the nature of the company's assets and liabilities, the number of
creditors, the likelihood of continued successful operation under reorganization, etc.,
would plainly be relevant.
270 Id. at 138.
271 Id.
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In view of the fact that no effort had been made to sell the Citizen,
and that there was no evidence with respect to what the market for
the paper might have been, the Court concluded that even if it had
been a filing company, the defense would still be unavailable to it.272
In short, the Court appears to hold that before a competitor may
purchase a failing company, the to-be-acquired firm must make an effort to sell its business first to non-competitors and then, if that is not
possible, to competitors, starting with the smallest companies first and
proceeding up the scale until a candidate is found. The questions I
asked in this regard with respect to Diebold in 1962 are equally pertinent today:
What guidelines must the financially embarrassed company follow in selecting a buyer? How does it justify to its creditors and
stockholders the acceptance of a lower bid? Is it feasible to require a company on the brink of financial disaster to shop around
for a non-competitor purchaser, and if any such cannot be found,
to assess the comparative vigor of those of its competitors who
might be induced to buy?273
Assuming that the stringent elements of the defense as defined
in Citizen Publishing can somehow be made out, the next, and perhaps most interesting, question is the one the Court does not answer
-is there a failing company defense in a case charging per se violations of the Sherman Act such as horizontal price-fixing and profit
pooling? I am satisfied that, both as a matter of logic and of precedent,
the defense should not be applicable in such cases. To begin with, we
must distinguish between a failing company defense to price-fixing
and a doctrine of defensive combination which, as I have suggested in
the past 2 74 might make some antitrust sense. I can understand framing
a rule based upon the rationale of Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States275 which would apply different substantive standards to failing
industries or to combinations of small businessmen seeking to create
countervailing power in face of a threat from larger competitors. 276
272 Id.

273 Handler, supra note 249, at 429.
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See, e.g., Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 CoLum. L. REv.

930, 954-55 (1962).
275 288 U.S. 344 (1933).

Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967):
It is argued, for example, that a number of small grocers might allocate territory
among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to the use of a common name
and common advertisements, and that this sort of venture should be welcomed
in the interests of competition, and should not be condemned as per se unlawful.
But condemnation of appellee's territorial arrangements certainly does not require
us to go so far as to condemn that quite different situation, whatever might be
the result if it were presented to us for decision.
Id. at 357 (dictum).
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But no antitrust rationale or public policy consideration has been
suggested to justify a successful solvent enterprise's agreeing to fix
prices with its less prosperous competitors.
Insofar as monopolization charges are concerned, if a company
seeks to achieve monopoly power by swallowing up a failing company,
it is difficult to see how the poor financial condition of the acquired
firm saves the transaction from section 2's strictures if the requisite
monopolistic intent or effect is present.
What about joint ventures? Since section 7 was held applicable
to joint ventures in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Corp.,277 one
could well argue that the failing company defense in section 7 cases
should likewise apply. I have a conceptual difficulty in envisaging the
circumstances under which- a failing company would ever enter into
a joint venture in the traditional sense in which the term has been
used. To me, a joint venture is a newly created enterprise in which
two existing enterprises invest their capital. It seems highly unlikely
that a company whose financial failure is imminent would be economically in a position to enter into such an arrangement, so that the
question may well be of academic interest only. If, however, a failing
concern were able to embark upon a classic type of joint venture, the
fact of its weak economic position would certainly be a highly relevant
fact in determining the legality of the enterprise under the principles
laid down in Penn-Olin. For example, how likely would a failing
company be to enter the relevant market absent the venture? What
quality of potential competition would be eliminated if one of the
joint venturers is close to insolvency? In resolving these, and similar
issues, the poor financial condition of one of the participants, although
it might not constitute an absolute defense, would certainly have to
be taken into account.
To be sure, Justice Harlan in his concurrence speaks of the Citizen Publishing arrangement as a "joint venture." But there both newspapers placed all their properties in a common pot, maintaining independent editorial activities and independent stock ownership. This
seems to partake of a partial or quasi-merger more than a conventional
joint venture. The Court's opinion appears to indicate that if two
companies want the benefit of rules appertaining to mergers and acquisitions, they must go ahead and merge. So long as business entities
hold themselves out to the public as competitors, the antitrust laws
require that they act as such.
Unfortunately, the Court does not analyze the theoretical under277 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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pinnings of the defense in merger litigations. There is substantial
support in amended section 7s legislative history278 for the view that,
if the acquired company is heading towards bankruptcy, the statute was
simply not intended to apply at all, so that the defense would be absolute. Under such a rule, the only issue would be whether in fact
the company was failing-nothing more. If that is the doctrine's
rationale, it makes a certain degree of sense to establish clear guidelines so that one can tell with some certainty whether or not an absolute defense is available with respect to a particular transaction.
And it is understandable why an absolute defense, like an exception,
will be strictly construed.
On the other hand, International Shoe, which preceded the
amended statute and gave judicial birth to the doctrine, approached
the inquiry merely as a part of the statutory assessment of the probable anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. 279 In this context, if
the acquired company's financial condition is so weak as to render it
an impotent competitor, it is hard to fathom how the merger with a
competitor can substantially lessen competition in the market. If the
focus is to be on competitive effect, it seems most inappropriate to
have rigid or doctrinaire rules as to how close to bankruptcy the failing company must be or what other attempts to sell it have been made
before the pertinent facts will be considered. In short, although Citizen Publishingmay, as a practical matter, have erased the defense, we
are yet to be told exactly why this furthers our antitrust goals.
CONCLUSION

For seventeen years I have annually reviewed the antitrust grist of
the Warren Court. Some of its decisions have met with applause; others
have been questioned. Contrasted with the spirited dissents these rulings
have evoked within the Court itself, the criticisms of the bar have
been quite muted. With a new Chief Justice and further changes in
the composition of the Court in the offing, a new chapter is about to
open. No Court writes on a tabula rasa. It builds on its inheritance,
discarding a bit here, adding a bit there, reshaping, clarifying and restating the law in the glorious tradition of the common law. Time
always adds a new dimension and perspective to our jurisprudence.
278 See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); Hearings before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 2734 (Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions),
81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 79-81, 134-36, 311-12 (1950).
279 280 U.S. at 302-03.
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What troubled or enthused the contemporary critic is viewed in a
new light. That is why the verdict of history does not always coincide
with contemporary judgments. There is every reason, in light of the
solid achievements of the past, for us to look with hope and confidence
to the future as we pursue our endless quest for the excellence that so
frequently eludes us.

